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1.  Introduction 
This paper is inspired by a puzzling empirical fact that despite the importance of 
controlling migration for their future, the host countries allocate very limited amounts 
of resources to the struggle against illegal immigration. To provide a partial 
explanation, the present model analyzes this issue in the context of low fertility in the 
host countries and suggests a novel channel though which the intensity of the struggle 
against immigration can be related to fertility. The analysis shows that for childless 
individuals, who have no reason to care about the future, it is optimal to contribute 
less to the costly immigration-prevention measures. 
  Following Ethier (1986), several researchers suggest the external border 
protection, internal enforcement and deportation as an appropriate strategy to reduce 
illegal immigration.
1 However, in practice, the amounts of resources devoted to such 
costly measures are relatively minor. Thus, for example, as Garcia (2006) points out, 
despite the importance of the enforcement of the border for the prevention of illegal 
entrance, the budget of the US Border Patrol was only 1.7 billion US$ in 1998.
2  
  The purpose of the present work is to contribute to a better understanding of 
the puzzle: Why, despite the importance of immigration control for their future, the 
amounts of resources allocated to immigration-prevention measures are so low? As a 
partial answer, this work refers to low levels of fertility in the host countries, which 
may be associated with a reduction of care about the future among childless 
individuals. The basic idea may be stated as follows. Consider an economy populated 
with two types of native agents: parents and childless. Natives of both types care 
about their private consumption and about the number of illegal immigrants arriving 
at their country. If, for some reason, illegal immigration has a negative effect on 
natives’ expected utility, this provides an incentive for allocating resources to the 
costly immigration-prevention measures. Suppose also that parents perceive that the 
offspring of immigrants, who enter the country in their generation, will negatively 
affect the utility of their children. In contrast, childless individuals do not care about 
the future. For this reason, childless agents neglect the future effect of the offspring of 
                                                  
1 Others have advocated transfers of resources to the source countries in order to reduce immigration 
pressure (see, e.g., Dula et al. 2006 and references therein). 
2 Although the budgets allocated to the US border and domestic control have recently increased in 
response to immigration pressure, they are still far lower than, for example, the total flows of the US 
foreign aid.   2
the immigrants and, as a result, their optimal contribution to immigration-prevention 
measures is lower that that of agents who have children. Moreover, if childless 
individuals behave strategically and take into account the others’ contributions, when 
they decide on the amount of their own contribution, they will further reduce the size 
of their contribution. 
  Of course, this mechanism alone cannot explain the puzzle of low intensity of 
the struggle against illegal immigration. Thus, for instance, the pro-immigration 
pressure of employers who are eager to reduce the cost of labor at the expense of the 
local workers or an involvement of the forces from the underground economy provide 
more powerful explanations.
3 But the current argument can serve in conjunction with 
the other explanations and thereby it improves our understanding of this important 
issue. 
  In this model, the only difference between individuals arises from different 
weights given to the offspring in the adult’s utility function. If this weight is below a 
certain threshold, for an adult agent it is optimal to remain childless. Otherwise, it is 
optimal to become a parent. In the model, each parent is assumed to give birth to one 
child. This assumption is an approximation to the situation in Europe, where native 
families with more than one child per parent are rare and in most countries the total 
fertility rate is far below two children per woman.
4  
  The present work borrows several elements from Garcia (2006), who uses a 
two-party electoral competition model to show that if the anti-immigration policy is a 
central issue in elections, an ideological rather than a pure opportunistic behavior 
gives parties an advantage to win the election. In contrast to Garcia, I abstract from 
any role of the formal government and add an intergenerational context, which is the 
central point of this study. 
    In Garcia (2006), who provides a line of references in support of this 
assumption, the negative effect of immigration on native agents’ expected utility is 
                                                  
3 An analysis of pro-immigration lobbying efforts of capital owners along with further references can 
be found, for example, in Epstein and Nitzan (2006). Epstein et al. (1999) argue that if foreign workers 
do not wish to return home, any guest-worker program, even though its intention is a temporary stay, 
will inevitably create a population of illegal immigrants. 
4 The assumption of an exogenously determined fertility differential between agents of different types 
that has been employed here is not crucial for this paper’s results. Any model with endogenous fertility 
will also generate a stronger effect of immigration on more fertile parents and, as a result, their optimal 
contribution to immigration-prevention measures will be higher. Some references to the large recent 
literature that employs endogenous fertility can be found, for example, in Azarnert (2008, 2010a). 
Cigno (2006) provides a renegotiation-proof constitutional theory of the family.   3
assumed to be induced by natives’ perception that immigration gives rise to 
delinquency and social insecurity. More generally, Epstein and Nitzan (2006) argue 
that the utility of the local population may be negatively related to the number of 
migrants as a result of the desire not to interact with different cultures, the effect of 
the finance of public goods, as well as welfare and distributional effects that adversely 
affect the local population. The findings of the large recent literature on the 
determining of the attitudes of natives toward immigrants, such as Bauer et al. (2000), 
Gang et al. (2002), Dustmann and Preston (2006, 2007), among others, also indicate 
that this negative effect can result from a fiscal burden of immigration, labor market 
considerations, welfare considerations and racial attitudes.
5 Each of these reasons can 
play an important role in the determining negative effect of immigration on local 
population, and this paper is about the consequences, not about reasons. 
  The assumption that the effect of immigration on the utility of the local 
population increases with the number of immigrants is consistent with the findings of 
the recent empirical studies, such as, for example, Dustmann and Preston (2001), 
Gang et al. (2002), that demonstrate that increasing concentration of ethnic minorities 
in local neighborhoods leads to more hostile attitudes toward minorities among locals.  
 
2.  The Model 
Consider an economy populated with two types of native agents: type-NC agents are 
childless and type-CH agents are parents who give birth to one child per parent. 
Suppose that the decision to remain childless follows from a low weight given to the 
offspring in the utility of the NC-type individuals relative to the cost of childbearing.  
Suppose that initially immigrants are absent and at the start the country is populated 
with the local population only.  
  The analysis abstracts from the utility of illegal immigrants and their offspring 
and concentrates on the host country’s native population only.  
 
2.1.  Individuals  
                                                  
5 Further references along with a model that analyzes a negative effect of redistribution in favor of 
minorities on the incentives to invest in human capital among locals can be found in Azarnert (2010b).   4
Natives of both types care about their private consumption and about the number of 
illegal immigrants arriving at the country (I ). Assume that for some reason illegal 
immigration has a negative effect on the native agents’ expected utility. This effect 
may be induced, for instance, by the natives’ perception that immigration gives rise 
to delinquency and social insecurity, the desire not to interact with different cultures, 
the effect of the finance of public goods, as well as welfare and distributional effects 
that adversely affect the local population. Suppose also that CH-type agents perceive 
that for the same reasons the offspring of immigrants, who enter the country in their 
generation, will negatively affect the utility of their children. The type-CH agents 
bear the costs of rearing their children, measured in terms of work time forgone, at δ  
per child, and care about the future well-being of their offspring. In contrast, the 
childless NC-type agents do not care about the future. 
Preferences of native individuals are represented by the following utility 
function:
6 
        )), ( ( 2 1 t t t t t nI W I C U β γ β − + − = +                          (1) 
where  t C  is the consumption level of an adult individual in period t,  t I  is the amount 
of immigrants living in the country in period t,
7  β  is a parameter that measures the 
impact of immigration on the utility of a native individual, γ  captures the relative 
weight given to the child in the utility function of an adult individual,  1 + t W  is the total 
future income of an individual’s child, n is the reproduction rate among immigrants, 
and  2 β  measures a perceived impact of the offspring of the period-t immigrants on 
the offspring of natives. 
  Suppose that the relative weight given to the child in the individual’s utility 
function is distributed over  ]   , [
max min γ γ . Therefore, if γ  is low enough, an individual 
                                                  
6 This particular form of the utility function is inspired by the one formulated by Garcia (2006) as: 
I C I c U i i i i β − = ) ( , where i  denotes skilled or unskilled native workers. 
    Because children in turn will concern about their children’s utility, a more general Barro-type utility 
function requires that the utility of parents should be represented by an infinite sum of utilities over 
different generations. However, because such utility function complicates the analysis without altering 
the qualitative nature of the results, in recent growth literature with endogenous fertility it became 
common to limit parental care to their own children only (see, e.g., references in Azarnert 2006, 2008, 
2009, 2010a). In the context of the present model, parental care about the future generations will only 
increase the incentive for CH-type individuals to devote resources to the anti-immigration measures, 
relative to the NC-type individuals, thus strengthening the major message of the present paper. 
7 If in period t  the size of the native population is normalized to one,  t I measures the fraction of 
population of immigrants to the native population.   5
decides to remain childless. Suppose that there is a threshold γˆ, such that as long as 
γ γ ˆ < , an individual decides to remain childless, while if  γ γ ˆ ≥ , an individual decides 
to become a parent. Further discussion is relegated to Section 2.4. 
  Therefore, given the threshold γˆ, preferences of native individuals of each 
type are represented as: 
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Native workers receive an income or salary ( t W ), which, after paying contributions, is 
devoted fully to consumption in the case of NC-type individuals and is allocated 
between consumption and childbearing in the case of CH-type individuals. Hence, 
native workers’ budget constraints are: 
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where 
j
t t  is the fraction of personal income contributed by a j-type individual to 
immigration prevention. The amount of contribution can not be negative. We assume 
that there are no other taxes in the economy and that the wage ( t W ) is the same across 
individuals and is exogenously determined. 
 
 2.2.  Illegal Immigration 
Suppose that the amount of illegal immigration that enters the country positively 
depends on the amount of potential immigration which is willing to reach the country, 
and it also negatively depends on the amount of resources devoted to immigration-
prevention measures, such as, for example, border protection and deportation. In order 
to capture this idea, assume that 
      , 0         , > = α
α
t t t T N I                            (3) 
where  t N  is the potential mass of immigration that wants to enter the country in 
period t,  t T  is the total amount of resources collected and allocated to immigration-
prevention measures, and α  is a parameter that measures the efficacy of such 
measures. 
  This particular function implies that the number of illegal immigrants that 
enter the country decreases with the amount of resources allocated to immigration-  6
prevention measures ( 0 < ′ T I ) with the decreasing returns to scale ( 0 > ′ ′ T I ), and it 
increases with the number of potential immigrants ( 0 > ′ N I ), given  0 < ′ ′ TN I . For 
technical tractability, suppose that  0 > t T  and  1 >
α
t T . 
 
 2.3.  Optimization 
Suppose first that native agents of each type behave non-strategically and maximize 
their own utility function, as specified in Eq. (1′), without taking into account the 
behavior of their counterparts from the other group. In such a case, given the budget 
constraints (Eq. 2), for a given amount of potential immigration, as specified in Eq. 
(3), the indirect utility function of each type of individuals is: 
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Optimization with respect to the level of contribution (
j
t t ) yields that 
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and, as a result, the amount of illegal immigration that enters the country is: 
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Equation (5) also demonstrates that the optimal contribution of a CH-type individual 
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 2.4.  Society as a Whole 
Suppose that the fraction of NC-type native agents with γ  below the threshold γˆ 
() ˆ   , [
min γ γ γ ∈ ) is S . Then, the fraction of CH-type native agents with γ  above the 
threshold  γˆ (]   , ˆ [
max γ γ γ ∈ ) is  S − 1 . Suppose also that the fraction of childless 
individuals of NC-type is not too high. If individuals of both types contribute in 
accordance with their own optimal level of t, the total amount of resources collected 
and allocated to immigration prevention measures is:   7
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and the total amount of immigration is: 
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Equations (7) and (8) yield the following proposition: 
  Proposition 1:  An increase in the fraction of NC-type individuals (S ) is associated 
with a decrease in the total amount of resources allocated to immigration prevention 
measures ( 0 < ′ s T ) and an increase in the total amount of immigration ( 0 > ′ s I) .  
Proceed now to the individuals’ utility. Substituting the optimal contribution 
of each type of individuals, as given in Eq. (5), and the total amount of immigration 
(Eq. 8) into Eq. (4), the utility levels are, respectively: 
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Equations (9) and (10) yield the following proposition: 
  Proposition 2:  An increase in the fraction of NC-type individuals (S ) is associated 
with a decline in the utility level of both types of individuals ( 0 < ′ s U) .  
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. An increase in S  implies 
that the fraction of individuals who optimally contribute more to immigration-
prevention measures decreases. As a consequence, for any optimal level of 
contribution of both types of individuals, the resulting amount of immigration 
increases, which in turn decreases utility of all native individuals.  
Equation (9) also implies that the utility of NC-type individuals is positively 
related to the magnitude of the perceived effect of immigration on the offspring of 
CH-type individuals ( 2 β ), as well as to the relative weight given to the offspring in 
their utility function (γ ). 
  The current formulation also allows us to compute the 'over-utility' of NC-type 
individuals and the 'under-utility' of CH-type individuals relative to the basic case   8
when the amount of immigration is determined by the contributions of individuals of 
one type only. Subtracting the potential utility, as specified in Eq. (4), given the rate 
of contribution (Eq. 5) and the potential amount of immigration as given in Eq. (6), 
from the corresponding utility levels when both types contribute in accordance with 
their share in population (Eqs. 9 and 10), the 'over-utility' of the NC-type is: 
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whereas the 'under-utility' of the CH-type is: 
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  Suppose now that individuals behave strategically and take into consideration 
others’ contributions, when they decide on the amount of their own contribution. In 
this case, an intuition says that the CH-type individuals will slightly increase their 
contribution in order to offset the lower amount of the NC-type’s contribution, 
whereas the NC-type will further reduce the size of their contribution. 
  To check this intuition, consider the extreme case, when the NC-type 
individuals reduce the size of their contribution to zero.
8 In this case, when  0 =
NC
t t  
and the total amount of contributed resources is  t
CH
t W t S) 1 ( − , a re-optimization of 
CH-type yields: 
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Hence 
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and 
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Obviously, such behavior will increase both the 'over-utility' of the NC-type 
agents and the 'under-utility' of the CH-type agents. Note also that, although in Eq. 
(13) , 0 > ′ s t  here as previously,  0 < ′ s T , 0 > ′ s I  and, as a result, for both types  0 < ′ s U . 
                                                  
8 Such behavior of NC-type is optimal if their fraction in population is low enough and the amount of 
contribution of CH-type is high enough.   9
The current formulation also allows us to shed some light on the effect of 
immigration on the decision of natives to become parents or remain childless. 
Suppose for a moment that the optimal contributions of each type of individuals and 
the amount of immigration are given. Now comparing the level of utility of parents 
and the level of utility of childless individual, as specified in Eq. (1′), for given 
CH t , 
NC t  and  t I , 
.
)) 1 ( (
ˆ












                       (16) 
From Eq. (16), it is immediately clear that a higher amount of immigration ( t I ), as 
well as a higher reproduction rate among immigrants (n), increase the threshold level 
γˆ, below which native individuals decide to remain childless. 
 
3.  Implications and Policy Recommendations 
The present framework allows us to formulate several suggestions regarding public 
policies that can have an immediate effect on the level of illegal immigration and the 
utility of native agents. 
 1. The model shows that the 'over-utility' of NC-type agents results from a relatively 
high contribution of CH-type agents, whose utility is in turn negatively affected by the 
presence of their NC-type counterparts who optimally contribute less, but, at the same 
time, enjoy from the higher contribution of the CH-type agents. In a sense, this 
generates a kind of "exploitation" of CH-type agents by the NC-type agents. As a 
consequence, some taxation of NC-type individuals, for example, limited by the 
amount of their 'over-utility', with the subsequent allocation of the proceeds to 
immigration-prevention measures, can be suggested. It will reduce both the NC-type’s 
'over-utility' and the CH-type’s 'under-utility' thereby generating a more just outcome.  
  In addition, as demographers frequently observe, the ex-ante expected fertility, 
as perceived by young adults, is often lower than their actual ex-post fertility. 
Therefore, such taxation may be to the benefit of young childless individuals, who ex-
ante behave as NC-type agents, but at a later stage of their life will, probably, change 
their minds and decide in favor of giving birth.  
 2. The model predicts that an increase in the attractiveness of having children, as 
captured by the relative weight given to a child in the utility function (γ ), will   10
increase the optimal size of the contribution of CH-type individuals. Moreover, if the 
decision to remain childless is driven by the low γ  relative to the cost childrearing in 
the utility of the NC-type, as has been assumed here, an increase in γ  will also lower 
the fraction of NC-type agents (S ) in the society. As a consequence, any public 
policy that focuses on an increase in the attractiveness of having children among the 
locals will contribute to an increase in the total amount of contributed resources ( i T ) 
and then will lead to a reduction in immigration. In addition, if the fraction of NC-
type agents in society will decrease, as stated in Proposition 2, this will lead to an 
increase in the utility level of both types of agents. In contrast, any pro-immigration 
special interest group has a clear reason to advocate an attractiveness of childlessness 
among the local population, which, in turn, as the model predicts, decreases the 
intensity of opposition to immigration. 
 3. The model implies that a higher rate of reproduction among immigrants, which is 
captured here by n, lowers the CH-type natives’ utility through their perception that 
the offspring of current immigrants will have an impact on their own children. This 
result may partly explain why the attitudes of local individuals are generally more 
negative toward immigrants from the Muslim countries and black Africa who are 
more likely to produce more children. It also appeals for a reassessment of current 
policies that lower the costs of having children for immigrants, especially for those 
whose reproduction rates are currently higher than that of natives.  
 
 4.  Conclusion 
This paper contributes to a better understanding of the puzzling empirical fact that 
despite the importance of immigration control for their future, the host countries 
allocate very limited amounts of resources to the struggle against illegal immigration. 
To provide a partial explanation, the present model analyzes this issue in the context 
of low fertility in the host countries and suggests a novel channel though which the 
intensity of the struggle against immigration can be related to fertility. The analysis 
shows that for childless individuals, who have no reason to care about the future, it is 
optimal to contribute less to the costly immigration-prevention measures. This 
argument can serve in conjunction with the other explanations and thereby it enriches   11
the discussion over migration policy, which is becoming a very important issue in the 
developed world. 
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